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Abstract 
The 2008 Bradley Review of Higher Education in Australia painted a 
disconcerting picture for tertiary-level learning and teaching in our 
country’s regional and remote areas. This diagnosis is in line with a 
range of other predictions for these same jurisdictions, regardless of 
whether they range over environmental, social, cultural, economic, 
governmental or Indigenous rationales. Clearly, across a range of 
criteria the situation is not good in Australia’s backblocks. Rather than 
employing the usual coterie of analyses (sociological, political, 
cultural or economic, for instance) might it be helpful to posit an 
alternative model for delineating regional knowledge, that is, a 
psycho-physiological approach? In particular, a cognitive model that 
Susan Leigh Star refers to as “regions of the mind” could be chosen 
Might learning and teaching itself find it useful to pay closer attention 
to this widespread understanding of the brain’s workings? The 
university is after all an institution that trains brains, which alerts us 
to another important issue in cognitive science: brain plasticity. 
Herein, brain regionalism and plasticity have more than a passing 
resonance with a geographically arraigned regionalism.  
Recognising that a primarily socio-economic or a 
governmental/structural solution to these problems is nowhere near 
enough, “The Resonating World of the Regional Mind+Brain” draws 
together these two divergent threads as a possible linking together of 
the regionality of cognition with its geographic namesake. It is 
through this umbilical linkage that a renewed prognosis of learning 
and teaching regionally might be conceived. This is a possible model 
for the rejuvenation of learning and teaching that centres on the 
ancient and universal notions of thought, memory and embeddedness, 
not as singular and separate individual occurrences but as a holistic 
and always resonating manifestation of collective knowledge, now 
largely conceived, produced, distributed and interpreted electronically. 
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So a man’s genitals are naturally disobedient and self-willed, like a creature 
that will not listen to reason, and will do anything in their mad lust for 
possession. Much the same is true of the matrix or womb in women, which is 
a living creature within them which longs to bear children. 
Plato (1973, [91], 122–123) 
“Irrationally” Regional 
In the Australian vernacular idiom it is sometimes said, mostly by women, that 
“men think with their dicks.” There does not seem to be an equivalent expression 
used by men, that is, “women think with their pussies”, or more politely, “think 
with their wombs.” As the above citation from Plato’s Timaeus suggests, though, 
the idea that human genitalia is a region of “irrational thought” has a long pedigree 
in Western culture. As much as we might argue against such a notion (or politely 
ignore it), Plato is inevitably right to suggest that both male and female genitalia 
are bodily regions through which “thought”, both rational and irrational, or an 
admixture of both and more besides, proceeds. Furthermore, it is important to 
remember that copulation (the coming together of these two sites of genital 
“irrationality”) is sometimes considered an instance of the animal within. This is 
sex understood as the lowest common denominator of human thought, feeling and 
action. 
The sexualisation of knowledge leads us to the idea that “lower” animals do not 
have the elevated forms of rational thought to which Homo sapiens have access. It 
might just be this refusal of rational thought and action to the genital region of the 
human body and its supposed total absence in the animal that provoked George 
Bataille (1992, p. 20) to write: “Nothing, as matter of fact, is more closed to us than 
this animal life from which we are descended.” It is this idea that there is a “penis 
instinct”, or a “vagina instinct” in the production of both rational and irrational, 
conscious and unconscious knowledge that, in part, inspired the whole 
psychoanalytic project, and even more broadly, the “psy-disciplines” (Rose, 1998). 
The collective project of the “psy-disciplines” has not only examined the human 
subject from this sexual/ancestral perspective but has also produced an overarching 
understanding of the “power of personhood” as each differing subjective instance 
is examined in the situated complexity of its own embedded actuality. 
Through a differing lens, and possibly because of this close relationship between 
sex and knowledge, John Berger (1984, p. 41) places “the sexual animal” in a 
wholly “impersonal”, almost a transcendent realm: 
The sexual animal — like a grain of corn — is a conduit of the past into the 
future. The scale of that span over millennia, and the distance covered by that 
temporal short circuit which is fertilization, are such that sexuality — even 
for women and men — is impersonal. The message dwarfs the messenger. 
The impersonal force of sexuality opposes the impersonal passing of time 
and is antithetical to it. 
If thinking and acting through our genitalia is a means of succumbing to and/or 
celebrating the feared animal within, possibly even giving it free rein, or that we 
Homo sapiens are deluded by our supposed sovereignty and that in reality are 
merely genetic messengers of the past, it is imperative to remember that under all 
the above conditions (and more) even sweet reason is just another manifestation of 
“ … thought [that] is necessarily an addiction from which we never get free” 
(Readings 1996, p. 128). Among its many attributes, reason is a deeply relativistic 
logical operation as well as a conjurer of singularly absolute obsessions. As we 
proceed through the following thought experiment, it is important to keep in mind 
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that both rational and irrational, conscious and unconscious knowledge are all 
intermediated by the whole physical and mental body, or more pertinently, the 
wide-ranging corpus of its various regions, not merely the genitalia or brain regions 
per se. 
Equally pertinent to this opening salvo is the widespread use of the term 
“balkanise”, meaning “to divide into small states hostile to one another” 
(Macquarie Dictionary, 2010). In stereotypical discussions of all things regional, 
the epithet balkanise is another version of this irrationalising tactic, this time 
directed at geographic regions and their sometimes ethnic, religious or linguistic 
insularity, or their occasionally dogmatic insistence on being nations. As Slavoj 
Zizek (1997, p. 38) reminds us this branding of the Balkans’ propensity for 
“irrational” violence is a projection: “the Balkans [is a] timeless space onto which 
the West projects its phantasmatic content.” Subsequently, almost any branding of 
irrationality is a mask for its accuser’s own hyper-rationality, a momentary 
delusion, or even a perpetually inscribed neurosis. It is this exclusive 
characterisation of regions, of either the geographic and sometimes even of the 
cognitive/corporeal kind, as sites of irrationality that continues to limit our capacity 
to materialise a sense of regionality: that is, to think, feel, act, even learn and teach 
through a regional/global mien, rather than the now more limited, some may say 
obsolete, national framework (on this point, see “The Decline of the Nation-State”, 
Readings, 1996, pp. 44–53). This latter national limitation is also one that self-
evidently afflicts the Bradley Report (2008) on the state of higher education in 
early 21st century Australia, a closer critique of which is forthcoming. 
Plastic Knowledge 
If this animal sensuality and irrationality as thought and acted out by humans in 
local/regional contexts has an epistemological component (and is therefore critical 
to any pedagogical understanding) it is also in congruence with Robyn Barnacle’s 
(2009) point that the body’s “gut instinct” is another of those bodily regions 
through which learning and teaching might be intermediated. Also, given the rise 
of mobile telephony, small gaming consoles like Nintendo and personal digital 
assistants (PDAs), there is also a debate to be had that elevates the opposing thumb 
and finger as another possible regional focus in the production of electronic 
knowledge. This idea of the opposing thumb and finger is a point that André Leroi-
Gourhan (1993, pp. 24–60) traces the long evolutionary trajectory of in a section of 
Gesture and Speech entitled “Brain and Hand.” Perhaps the most sophisticated 
variation on this theme of the body’s regional specificity is Didier Anzieu’s (1989) 
The Skin Ego, where thought and thus the production of knowledge is mediated by 
the highly porous haptic sense. Invoking the skin in this way suggests a “haptic 
aesthetic” in knowledge-making (Fisher, 1997; also, see Marks, 2002, for a 
nuanced discussion on “touch” in electronic media). The ears and tongue, and the 
eyes have, naturally enough, always been considered important regions for the 
intermediation of knowledge in oral and literate cultures respectively. Another 
variation on this theme is the learning styles debate, one in which learners are 
categorised into a “head”, “hands” and “heart” means of pedagogical 
differentiation (Brown et al., 2005; Kolb & Kolb, 2005) and is an idea that arises 
out of the influential Bloom’s taxonomy. There is also some affinity here with 
Howard Gardner’s theory of “multiple intelligences” (Gardner, 2006). 
In citing these various ideas about the pertinence of particular regions of the body 
and their various pedagogical particularities I have not yet explicitly mentioned the 
brain, the region par excellence vis-à-vis intelligence. Without in any way 
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dismissing the previous introductory overview as unimportant — every region of 
the body has a significant and variably intermediating role to play in electronically 
configured, open structured and multimodal forms of knowledge — the heart of the 
present investigation is the possible relationship between the “regions of the mind” 
idea (Star, 1989, p. ) and a geographical understanding of regions. This debate has 
been given extra bounce by the now widely accepted process of brain plasticity, 
which François Ansermet and Pierre Magistretti (2007, p. 10) say, “entails moving 
on to a new paradigm and enables us to effect a scientific revolution in the Kuhnian 
sense.” In the terms set by Thomas Kuhn’s well-known thesis, brain plasticity is a 
high order paradigm shift. 
It now seems apparent there is a First Law of Neurobiology: “Neurons that fire 
together wire together” (Edelman & Tononi, quoted in the frontispiece of Connolly 
2002), a maxim repeated in nearly every work on the subject. The emergence of 
brain plasticity may well prove that our cognitive capacity is indeed musculature in 
the sense that the more mental exercise the neural network gets the more robust and 
adaptively capable it becomes over the course of our lives. It matters less that these 
psycho-neurological, adaptively plastic capabilities are largely lost at death: a vast, 
even if a still largely incomplete record is left behind in a variety of traces, traces 
that are now primarily electronic in character and structure. During the life-course, 
though, cognitive plasticity and local/regional embeddedness appear to go hand-in-
hand: 
Plasticity entails the obvious fact that, through the sum of lived experiences, 
each individual is seen to be unique and unpredictable beyond the 
determinations of his genetic background. The universal laws defined by 
neurobiology thus inevitably end in the production of the unique. (Ansermet 
& Magistretti, 2007, p. 6) 
Every person’s individual experiential circumstances, in all their multitudinous 
complexity, constitute the possibility of their cognitive plasticity, a point that 
applies not simply to personal experience but also to our educational experience. 
Now it is even widely recognised that the newly born human infant is “far from 
being a freely instructable tabula rasa”, there is “an immense knowledge base 
about the properties of the world” embedded in their “genetically determined 
functional architecture” (Singer 2007, pp. 99–100, original italics). There is a 
discernable degree of suppleness in the brain that continues across and through the 
life-course that does not simply stop at puberty. While adding further weight to 
David A. Kolb’s (1984) already influential notion of “experiential learning”, 
cognitive plasticity must then be understood as the primary setting for recording, 
physiologically and psychologically, this self-same and always motile subjective 
experience of life’s embedded actuality. It is unquestionably at the local/regional 
scale that this life-experience is most profoundly inculcated in humans; this is the 
scale where each and every one of us comes into the most intimate contact with the 
embedded reality of the world while simultaneously providing the primary mental 
data through which we re/create both our individual and possibly even our 
collective understanding of that world. 
Please Explain the Word “Region”? 
Before exploring the “regions of the mind” debate and its relation to a geographical 
understanding of regions, though, it is essential to once again remind ourselves of 
the evolutionary meaning of the word “region” and how it is understood 
linguistically in historical and geographical debates rather than simply neurological 
ones. If “thought is necessarily an addiction from which we never get free” 
(Readings, 1996, p. 128), we are also never entirely free of the past uses and 
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meanings of any given word that feed our thoughts mostly because, as Robert 
Pogue Harrison (2003, p. 72) says, “Regardless of our dialect, we speak with the 
words of the dead.” The word “region” is instructive in this sense. Etymology is the 
discipline that bequeaths us this understanding of the historical and sometimes 
even the spatial development of words. In Raymond Williams’ Keywords (1983, p. 
264) there is a useful etymological analysis of the word region, whose arrival in 
English in the early 14th century from the Latin word “regionem – direction, 
boundary, district” and “regere – to direct or to rule” identifies an important 
linguistic framing of the term that remains pertinent to this day: “There is an 
evident tension within the word, as between a distinct area and a definite part. Each 
sense has survived, but it is the latter which carries an important history. 
Everything depends, in the latter sense, on the term of relation: a part of what?” 
The etymological inheritance of the word region as a “distinct area” though 
remains significant given that sovereignty-producing borders are still a relatively 
fixed phenomenon, not only for legal, but also for migratory, ownership and 
control reasons. For Michel Foucault (1980, 68, original italics), the “Region is a 
fiscal, administrative, military notion.” As Williams implies, though, the term 
“region”, both in the evolutionary form of its meaning and in practice, has a long 
history of “relationality” about it: it can be both “a distinct area and a definite part”, 
a point that doesn’t discount its “fiscal, administrative or military” meaning but 
enhances all the above distinctions and more. 
Marie-Claude Smouts (1998, p. 30) provides a lingering etymological back-beat to 
this relational rendering: “It is a characteristic of the region to have neither a 
definition nor an outline. The empirical criteria which allow the socio-economic 
entity to be recognised as sufficiently homogeneous and distinct, are vague and 
mixed.” This relative ambiguity at the heart of the word “region” also materialises 
in economic structures, an idea very much underscored by Neil Smith’s (1993, p. 
109) comment that, 
Much as it is internally constructed, the social economy of the region is also 
fashioned in the swirl of national and international economic processes, 
events and developments; and in so far as regions specialize in specific types 
and conditions of production, making commodities or selling services for a 
wider market, regional borders are highly porous and changeable. 
As a category form then (be it a linguistic, bio-natural, political, economic, social, 
cultural, psychological, and maybe even a neurological differentiation), the region 
as idea and actuality is neither a precursor to, nor does it inherit in any 
deterministic way, the baggage of sovereignty and selfhood that has so 
characterised literate/national attachments to space and mind+brain operations. 
Rather than being in-bred and parochial, knowledge-making in a regional 
framework is constituted in and mediated through what Allen J. Scott (1998, p. 
152) calls a global polity characterised by “a mosaic of regions”, a systemic (but 
hardly systematic) arrangement of semi-autonomous but always intermediating 
geo-political spatial arrangements. Globalisation is enveloped here in a wide range 
of variously scaleable regionating structures manifested through domestic, local, 
sub-national, national, supra-national, continental and even oceanic formations. 
This post Bretton Woods global/regional geo-political orientation of the current 
world order (Storper & Scott, 1995) is one where the more virtualised forms of 
instantaneous electronic communication are augmented in reality by easy access (at 
least for particular portions of the population) to a network of jet travel entraining 
the planet. Transformations in the geo-political world order are often accompanied 
by transformations in both transport and communicative infrastructure. There can 
be little doubt we are in the middle of just such a long-term conceptual and 
material political/structural transformation at the current juncture. 
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This posited relationship between the twinned ideas of the region as it is 
understood in a political, historical and geographical sense and how it is configured 
in a neurological sense might seem to be an entirely arbitrary one but the human 
head and the image of the planet have long had an analogous relationship. Plato 
makes a direct comparison between the head and the cosmos in the Timaeus. The 
obvious analogical relationship between the bicameral parliament in national 
polities and the bicameral, left/right hemispherical splitting of the mind+brain is an 
obvious example of the above point in political theory. (Ironically, while the 
left/right split in political discourse actually has an inverse relationship to left 
brain/right brain characteristics, it is highly probable that this dualistic 
hemispherical splitting of the brain is also the source of the increasingly discredited 
idea of binary oppositions which has produced the now familiar enough trope: 
“There are two sides to every story”). Also, we often think of a particular frame of 
mind or an ideology as a “world view.” Both the “global mosaic of regions” and 
the “regions of the mind” debates suggest we are evolving away from 
understanding the world in a left/right, either/or fashion, both cognitively and 
politically. These transformations suggest a more dynamic, multi-perspectival, 
spatially configured view of the world that is, variously and simultaneously, 
egocentric and allocentric. 
Cybernetic-Style Cognition 
It is with the arrival of cybernetic knowledge (and its principal technology of the 
computer) that the brain-and-analogous-regional-world juxtaposition moves 
beyond a speculatively interesting idea. Although the brain-as-computer metaphor 
is often called into question (Penrose, 1998; Searle, 1983), this does not mean that 
cybernetics is not a fruitful way to think about how the mind+brain and geographic 
region ideas are intermediated. In this vein, Brian Massumi (2002, p. 34), puts an 
illuminating cybernetic spin on this ambiguous b/ordering of regional space, one 
that could be at once political and/or historical, geographical and/or neurological, 
fixed and/or malleable: 
A germinal or “implicit” form cannot be understood as a shape or structure. It 
is more a bundle of potential functions localized, as a differentiated region, 
within a larger field of potential. In each region a shape or structure begins to 
form, but no sooner dissolves as its region shifts in relation to the others with 
which it is in tension. There is a kind of bubbling of structuration in a 
turbulent soup of regions of swirling potential. The regions are separated 
from each other by dynamic thresholds rather than by boundaries. 
Undoubtedly, Massumi is channelling Deleuze and Guattari but this 
ambiguousness vis-à-vis a region’s dominion and/or legal and/or constitutional 
and/or military and/or neurological and/or spatial and/or disciplinary status is both 
a positive and a negative given that the sometimes bloody history of demarcation 
associated with bordering and sovereignty in the nation-state has become so 
ingrained as to be naturalised and up until recently largely unquestioned. As we 
slowly move away from the supposed sovereign stability of the nation-state form 
(for further discussions on this theme see Amin, Massey, & Thrift 2003; Cheah & 
Robbins 1998; Hudson & Brown 2004), it now seems the right moment to state 
more clearly the nucleated centre of this discussion: a planetary polity framed by 
the “global/regional mosaic”, or rather, a matrix-like geo-political global 
configuration, in conjunction with the “regions of the mind” debate, provide a 
useful dialogical mapping exercise, or thought experiment, that might help us 
better understand the way knowledge is produced and disseminated at the current 
moment. And because regional universities are already ideally placed in this 
global/regional geo-political matrix, a “cognitive mapping” exercise of this kind 
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might also help us to re-imagine our future beyond the narrow procedural and 
structural limitations of the Bradley Review (2008). 
The Bradley Review is undoubtedly a key document in the Australian tertiary 
sector, one particularly pertinent to its pedagogical responsibilities. Its pragmatic 
orientation covers important issues like voucher systems, international students, the 
low socio-economic status of some Australian born students, tertiary education’s 
relationship to vocational education and training (VET), public and private 
contributions to higher education, staff-student ratios, retention rates, accreditation, 
the quality audit process, governance arrangements, HECS fees and, among other 
things, the variously interlocking bureaucratic arrangements in which Australian 
tertiary education is cast. By definition, the Bradley Review successfully sets out to 
do what its generic specificity allows it to do, no more, no less. Its analysis of the 
information and communication technology (ICT) r/evolution, though, is limited at 
best. Unlike the interrelating insights between leadership and elearning found in 
Scott, Coates, and Anderson (2008), where the changing circumstances of higher 
education take centre stage on the crucial question of academic management and 
leadership, the Bradley Review is especially limited on discussion of the regional 
question; it accepts without apparent questioning its own internal contradiction that 
while acknowledging that regional issues are the most difficult the sector faces it 
devotes only a few pages to analysing them and proposing possible solutions. 
Clearly, a nationally defined agenda cannot even hope to cope with a regionally 
specific one. 
Already one Bradley Report recommendation to encourage the national 
amalgamation of a number of regional universities has fallen off the radar with 
Charles Sturt University and Southern Cross University pulling out of initial 
discussions on the proposal. Furthermore, higher education policy analyst, Gavin 
Moodie, and others (Hare 2010; Moodie, 2010), have criticised the inadequate 
government response to the question of regional loadings, a special pot of money 
allocated to many regional universities to prop up a number of small, mostly 
unviable campuses they are responsible for. According to Moodie (2010), this 
regional loadings paper from the Department of Education, Employment and 
Workplace Relations “conflates the entire agenda around regional and rural 
provision to increasing enrolments”, ignoring crucial issues like “decentralisation” 
and “[e]conomic, social and cultural inputs” (Moodie, quoted in Hare, 2010, p. 3). 
After questioning whether regional universities have any substantive effect on local 
student participation, Moodie concludes by saying that, “In the end the level of 
support a nation commits to its regions and their campuses is a value judgment: 
how much does the nation want its educational, social and economic wellbeing 
determined by the big capital cities?” (Moodie, 2010, p. 38). The hyper-politicised 
empirical pragmatism of the Bradley Report (with its pseudo-scientific and 
apolitical appearance) neatly avoids making a case for these value judgments, 
particularly apparent on the issue of regional universities and decentralisation 
where a persuasive argument on the long-term sustainability of both city and 
country could easily be made by connecting with broader debates on overpopulated 
cities and underpopulated regions. 
What is an important value judgment to argue for is that not only are regional 
universities but the entire higher education system in Australia (not to mention the 
health care system and almost every facet of national life to a greater or lesser 
degree) are caught up in the nation’s dysfunctional and outdated federal system of 
governance, the latter a point forcefully advanced by A. J. Brown (2005) among 
others. By being commissioned in the first instance through a national and a 
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narrowly conceived empirical framework the Bradley Report is unable to tackle the 
deeper structural issues of federal/state governance that plague many of our 
educational problems. The issue of governance itself is a starting point for us here, 
followed by the deep structural changes wrought by the ICT r/evolution and the 
significant advances made by the cognitive sciences, all of which are now wrapped 
up in a cybernetic epistemology. Until a fuller acknowledgement that these 
multiple structural changes are having a substantive affect on higher learning there 
is little likelihood of the government and the sector agreeing let alone acting on an 
adequate response. This thought experiment (or cognitive mapping exercise) is 
designed to address just one aspect of these longer-term changes: delineating a 
possible relationship between geographic regions and brain regions in the hope of 
developing a deeper understanding of both the cognitive and 
political/cultural/psychic possibilities inherent in the practice of elearning as the 
latter is entwined in this already mentioned global/regional geopolitical dynamic. 
It is no coincidence that at the very heart of “cognitive mapping” is a spatial 
emphasis, a quality it shares with many electronic techniques especially computer 
gaming (Aarseth, 2001; McClurg & Chaillé, 1987); and it is an idea that helps us to 
juxtapose geographic regions with brain regions. Articulated in the work of Kevin 
Lynch (1960) in The Image of the City, but also harking back to Edward C. 
Tolman’s (1948) work on “Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men”, cognitive mapping 
arises out of our “sense of the whole” and allows us to “build an image” of our 
multidimensional environment from the “paths”, “edges”, “districts”, “nodes” and 
“landmarks” (Lynch, 1960), indeed a shifting matrix of forms, ideas and structures 
that are both singularly embedded in particular locations and form a component of 
that “sense of the whole.” Frederic Jameson (1988, p, 353) up-scales this idea to 
the global arena by saying, “the mental map of city space explored by Lynch can 
be extrapolated to that mental map of the social and global totality we all carry 
around in our heads in variously garbled forms.” Here it is useful to invoke the 
other meaning of “global”, and that is of the totality of a situation or object: the 
totality of the self-same human (the egocentric view) is now very much infused by 
our particular place in the totality of our planetary habitat (the allocentric view). 
With the advent of globalisation, every self is now well and truly mapped to both 
its immediate local/regional context and to its planetary habitat. 
It is now but a short step to locating cognitive mapping within a cybernetic 
conception of electronic pedagogy, or as Gregory Ulmer (2003) calls it “electracy.” 
In Understanding and Learning Virtual Spaces, Patrick Péruch and colleagues 
(2000, p. 108) write that, 
… cognitive mapping refers to the process of forming internal spatial 
representations of the environment that can be subsequently and flexibly used 
in navigating and in communicating with others, as opposed to the more rigid 
representations that make up pure route knowledge. 
“Route knowledge” is more akin to the serial form that knowledge takes in both 
literate forms and alphabetic consciousness while cognitive mapping is more 
appropriate to the already mentioned spatial propensity of electronic forms of 
knowledge. The more mosaic-like structure of the “the resonating world of the 
regional mind+brain”, constituted in and through the act of cognitive mapping, is a 
better fit for the computationally mediated parallel epistemologies of high-speed 
electrate knowledge, being applicable to both real and virtual worlds and their 
intermediation. Brian Rotman (2008, p. 83) provides a useful account of “the 
serial/parallel duo”, saying of it that 
the opposition appears and reappears in many familiar places: music (melody 
versus harmony), symbolic forms (text versus image), arithmetic (ordinal 
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versus cardinal numbers), film editing (Eisenstein versus intercut montage), 
electrical circuits (series versus parallel), and, of particular interest here, 
serial as opposed to parallel computing. 
This is not simply digitally configured cognitive augmentation as it is “socially 
constructed” by the “personal computer” (Jensen, 1993, p. ) because the latter 
designation largely seems to be economically fixated rather than socially focussed, 
a means to sell more computers. Rather, our understanding of the dynamic nature 
of both this “regional world” and of “regional cognition” is on a scale not clearly 
understood before. As Péruch et al. (2000) reiterate throughout the course of their 
discussion, neuronal digital imaging tools like Event Related Potentials (ERPs), 
Magnetic Electroencephalography (MEG), Positron Emission Tomography (PET) 
and functional Magnetic Resonance Imagery (fMRI), particularly the latter, offer a 
technical means via which brain regions quite literally light up in the act of 
thinking, that is, of course, only when cognitive activity is being recorded by some 
electronic device. There is, then, in this connection a possible match between 
cognitive mapping as a technique of thinking and acting in the world and brain 
imaging as a digital informatic technology. Anne Beaulieu (2001, pp. 661–665) 
goes so far as to say that the depiction of voxels by brain imaging technologies 
posit a form of “digital objectivity” as a crucial attribute of e-science. Our 
computers might be social and personal, are even able to be personalised for 
economic reasons, but it now seems that the mind+brain can have its regionating 
capacities digitally “objectified” across its network like operations. 
The Regional Mind+Brain 
As both Barbara Tizard (1959) and Susan Leigh Star (1989) reiterate, the study of 
brain function has mostly oscillated between “localization theories, which hold that 
specific functions are controlled by specific parts of the brain, and field [or 
diffusionist] theories, which hold that the brain acts as a single functional unit,” 
and further, “that historically, a swing of the pendulum tends to occur between 
these two positions” (Tizard, 1959, p. 132). Combined, both positions are a classic 
example of the “either/or” mentality attendant to a great deal of scientific and 
humanities thought, especially of the literate variety. That both positions could 
operate together, or that brain function could operate otherwise, via some 
technological or somatic prosthesis for example, possibly even via some of the 
many highly variable accounts of synaesthesia (see Mulvenna, 2007, for one such 
account) does not seem to enter into the traditional “either/or” equation of the 
localization/diffusion debate. The learning brain is, after all, the very model of a 
complex system (Van Geert & Steenbeck, 2007); indeed, it could rightly be the 
model for the emergence of complexity theory itself, the latter a point Richard E. 
Lee (2003, pp. 197–200) analyses in connection with “the politics and 
transformation of the structures of knowledge” in a post-1968 world. If the brain is 
considered in light of complexity theory then a bottom-up functionality (equivalent 
to the “localization” view) and a top-down functionality (equivalent to the “field 
theory” view) are simultaneously, even if variably plausible. Further, the various 
regions of the brain might sometimes work simultaneously, sometimes 
autonomously, sometimes interactively, may be even antagonistically on the 
operational plane. 
This limited conceptual framing of the “localization/field theory” dichotomy has a 
resonance with what John Agnew (1999, pp. 92–93) sees as the “realism versus 
constructionism” opposition that plagues discussion on the region in 
“contemporary geography”: “realists” argue that regions are “out there” in reality, 
while constructionists “regard all regions as mere inventions of an observer.” As 
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Agnew further observes of this oversimplification: “Human behavior [even human 
cognition?], therefore, cannot be reduced to one or the other but is constituted by 
both [and more besides?]. Regions both reflect differences in the world and ideas 
about differences.” Contra to Agnew’s essay title though – “Regions on the Mind 
Does Not Equal Regions of the Mind” – I am now able to say with a little more 
certainty (could it be a belief?) that there might actually be some associative 
correlation between the “regions of the mind” debate and Scott’s already 
mentioned “global mosaic of regions” debate, a connection both abstract and 
actual, one brought about by my own cognitive mapping exercise and itself a self-
reflexive thought experiment. While the connection remains speculative, it is 
nonetheless a useful way to rethink the essence of elearning and eteaching at the 
current moment. 
Even though Star (1989) entitles her work “regions of the mind” and labels the 
proponents of the relevant brain function movement as “localization theory”, there 
is no semantic distinction made between these two closely related terms. If we are 
to take both terms — “local” and “regional” — as they are used in the cognitive 
sciences to mean that the various parts of the brain are mainly autonomous in their 
function, the use of the latter term in this context remains imprecise if we keep in 
mind the earlier discussed etymology of the word “region.” Kevin Lynch’s (1976, 
p. 10) point that “Our senses are local, while our experience is regional” is worth 
keeping in mind when reflecting on this semantic distinction in brain function. In 
cognitive terms, our sensate capacities are limited to the immediate bodily context 
of our localised existence while our experiential capacities are brought into being 
by the regional context within which we operate on a day-to-day, week-by-week, 
even year-by-year basis. Both our senses and our experience contribute to the 
semantic content unique to each individual mind+brain combination, a point John 
Searle (1983, p. 32) uses to introduce his well known Chinese symbols “thought-
experiment.” “The reason that no computer program can ever be a mind is simply 
that a computer program is only syntactical, and minds are more than syntactical. 
Minds are semantical, in the sense that they have more than a formal structure, they 
have a content.” As our neurons fire and wire together in response to our sensate 
and experiential life-course in a particular environment (Blakemore 1998) we are 
also in the perennial process of reprogramming the plastic capacity of the inherited 
biological entity that is our mind+brain, through acting in, reacting to, and being 
embedded in our phenomenal life-world. This is the cognitive intermediation of the 
nature/nurture connection, and in high-speed, always dynamic knowledge contexts, 
stable boundaries may be more hindrance than help. Of course, a particular 
environment can also include the various pedagogical contexts in which we operate 
and the kind of mental “realities” produced therein. Regardless of the worth, 
ambiguity and/or falsity of this connection between regions of the mind and the 
geographical understanding of regions, it is imperative that both educationalists 
and their associated policy makers incorporate an understanding of 
“neuroeducation” (on this topic see the essays collected in Battro et al. 2007) into 
their deliberations, something keenly lacking in the Bradley Report. Teaching and 
learning, then, have both a physiological and a psychological base that is highly 
malleable, an obvious point but one that is sometimes forgotten in the ideologically 
loaded debates over education. 
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Computer Augmented Associational 
Reasoning 
In light of the earlier mentioned antagonism of both Roger Penrose and John Searle 
(and others) to the brain as computer model, there is ample scope to be sceptical 
about Ray Kurzweil’s (1999, p. 105) claim that “… it is reasonable to estimate that 
a $1,000 personal computer will match the computing speed and capacity of the 
human brain by around the year 2020 …”, and further that “Supercomputers will 
reach the 20 million billion calculations per second capacity of the human brain 
around 2010, a decade earlier than personal computers.” Kurzweil’s 
structural/functional interpretation ignores the epigenetic factors that each brain is 
heir to in its phenomenal life-course, and in a Lamarckian world-view these factors 
can be incorporated back into the physiology of the subsequent genome of any 
potential offspring. Kurzweil (1999, p. 92) does, however, recognise the brain as a 
complex intersection of regions; for instance, “the hippocampus, with capacities for 
storing memories of sensory experiences and events” and “the amygdala, with 
circuits for translating fear into a series of alarms to trigger other regions of the 
brain.” It is the amygdala that is one region of the brain worth investigating further 
in this global/regional world intermediated by electronic communication, or 
electracy. 
As Gregory Ulmer (1994, p. 36) sees it, in the shift from a literate mode of thought 
(with its “linear indexical” reasoning) to electronic logic (with its “network 
associational” reasoning) there is a more substantial cognitive emphasis on 
associational reasoning via “conduction” as the logical/cognitive interpolator 
(Ulmer, 1989, pp. 44–81). In the wake of the increasing importance of conductive 
logic in electronic realms, the mind+brain’s vast storehouse of memories become 
the database on which the multitudinous elements of associational connection by 
conduction rest. This techno-cognitive shift might also help explain the rise of the 
database as a significant electronic form (Manovich, 2001, pp. 212–243). More 
pertinently, it is a widespread understanding in the neurosciences that the 
“amygdala complex … is important for associative learning” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 
311). Further, the amygdala is itself a small region in the more ancient limbic 
system of the brain and one that also intermediates our fear responses, among other 
autonomic functions. If there is a symbiotic connection between electracy and the 
amygdala’s propensity for associative reasoning, then the “advances” made by 
electronic knowledge are also in a direct but nevertheless a “regressive” 
relationship to more ancient forms of cognitive engagement, allowing a possible 
return of the animal, at least in communicational terms. This progressive/regressive 
connection (which now stands as a testable hypothesis of this discussion), if true, is 
one that we should be aware of because it adds another layer of complexity to new 
media education both as a discipline and a medium, as well as reiterating electronic 
pedagogy’s ability to cross a multitude of boundaries. 
If, as John Searle (1983, p. 38) suggests, in the short term “Technological progress 
is always grossly exaggerated …”; however, it is in the long term that its cognitive 
and thus pedagogical consequences are mostly underestimated. Both Marshall 
McLuhan (1962) and Walter Ong (1988) insisted that various forms of knowledge 
restructure consciousness over the long term. As meaning-making with a wide 
variety of electronic forms of knowledge continues to expand exponentially, 
variously incorporating, transforming and transcending oral and literate forms, 
might it be that there is also a long-term transformation going on both memorially 
(in content terms) and neurologically (in structural/functional terms) in our learning 
capacities? An affirmative response is the most likely answer. The infinite 
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juxtapositional complexity of associational reasoning rests on the brain’s 
architectonics: a 100 billion each of neuronal and glial cells interconnected 
chemically and electrically by over 100 trillion synapses (Parnavelas, 1998). It is 
this unimaginable intermediating complexity that most likely propelled David 
Porush (1998, p. 46) to remark that, 
The brain is intrinsically a sur-rational machine for bringing worlds into 
collision, a metaphor devise, a translation circuit for closing and opening the 
loop between incommensurate and mutually incomprehensible universes. In 
my view, it is already meta-physical. 
As the mind+brain inside us intermediates what is out there with an internally 
located biological/feeling place in here, a self-reflexive disposition is the inevitable 
result. Rather than a subject/object relation there is, in this entwining of 
meta/physicality, an “I-I” relation (Ulmer, 2003, p. 57), my body entrained with 
my mind+brain continuously meets and interacts with the flow of data in a specific 
time and place. No matter where I am on the planet the various regions of my 
mind+brain work in conjunction with the actual region of my habitation and the 
global/regional geo-political matrix in and through which all these entities are 
infused. 
As yet another instance of new media, brain imaging technology offers up a unique 
reversal: “In one sense, modern medicine has always tried to make the body 
legible; if Biblical hermeneutics recalls the incarnation of God’s word in text, or 
the Word made flesh, then medical hermeneutics reverses this equation to give us 
the flesh made word” (Curtis, 2004, p. 223). This reversal entails less an 
examination of what is “out there” and more epistemological attention to what’s 
“in here”, particularly to the internal workings of the mind+brain, less so as 
“word”, as Curtis says, but as a constantly shifting but synaesthetic amalgamation 
of graphic visualisation, auditory messages and textual information, or as Gunther 
Kress and Theo van Leeuwen (2001) call it “multimodality”. Inevitably, these 
developments entail a closer examination of meta-learning (a self-reflexive “I-I” 
activity), in contrast to the more straightforward and largely assumed forms of 
content learning (a subject/object activity). The very essence of meta-learning is 
re/learning how to learn, that is, examining how it is that we learn under these 
transformed political/cultural arrangements with the knowledge provided by both 
the electronic and the cognitive r/evolutions. 
The Electronic Resonance Machine 
A highly significant feature of meta-learning in electronically mediated contexts is 
resonance. If the brain, like the Internet, is electrically charged then this capacity of 
both intra-cognitive and intra-global communication sets up a distinctive means of 
causality. Historically, linear causality is often associated with alphabetic forms of 
reason. Resonant forms of reasoning, though, have an unambiguous connection to 
nearly every instance of electronic knowledge, and this is a situation ably described 
in a political sense by William Connolly (2005, p. 870, original italics): 
Rather, in politics diverse elements infiltrate into the others, metabolizing 
into a moving complex—Causation as resonance between elements that 
become fused together to a considerable degree. Here causality, as relations 
of dependence between separate factors, morphs into energized complexities 
of mutual imbrication and interinvolvement, in which heretofore unconnected 
or loosely associated elements fold, blend, emulsify and dissolve into each 
other, forging a qualitative assemblage resistant to classical models of 
explanation. 
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Certainly, from a both political and a communicative perspective Connolly seems 
to have a dim view of this “resonance machine” while only making an indirect 
connection to the potentialities of electronic knowledge. Even in Connolly’s (2002) 
earlier Neuropolitics, there seems to be no explicit connection or extended 
discussion on the relationship between electronic techniques and technologies per 
se and resonant causality. On the other hand, he advocates a kind of resonant 
political program carried on across a wide range of fronts to deal with this 
situation. Undoubtedly though, the term “resonance machine” could apply equally 
to the brain as to the communicative practices of the American polity that Connolly 
describes. (Although Connolly mainly references the American polity, there is a 
substantial application of this idea of resonant causality to the rest of the planet, 
especially in those areas where electronic knowledge proliferates.) Resonance, 
from both an associational logic point of view as well as being a significant 
attribute of electronic techniques and technologies (or “electracy”), compounds the 
seemingly il/logical juxtaposition of an infinite array of elements from a wide 
range of sources and meanings. The resources available to resonant reasoning are 
the vast number of databases of “everything miscellaneous” (Weinberger, 2007) 
that are now on offer in an electro-energised global skein. This phalanx of digitised 
data now stands in an analogous relationship to the database we refer to as human 
memory, both of which provide the raw material for the continuously vibratory 
potential of resonant reasoning along with the multitudinous “rational” and 
“irrational” causal associations it foregrounds. It may not be any specific personal 
computer that will eventually match the human intellect but quite possibly the 
interconnection, via the Internet, of all the personal and super computers on the 
planet. In any event, causality as resonance, and inversely, resonant causality as a 
pre-eminent feature of electrate learning environments is likely to be increasingly 
pervasive and persuasive. 
The World’s Brainiest T-Shirt 
We know from Roland Barthes’ (1973) analysis of “the brain of Einstein” how 
easy it is to mythologise the cognitive realm of a “genius.” Indeed, the story of 
Einstein’s brain after his death (stored in a colleague’s office for a number of years 
then transported across America to eventually become an object of intense and 
ongoing scientific interest) might serve as a precursive indicator of just how 
“mythic” even the “ordinary” brain has now become after the Decade of the Brain 
in the 1990s. Not only is cognition regionally distributed within corporeal 
boundaries, the brain is now an electronically arbitrated and a globally distributed 
entity as much as a sovereign artefact existing inside our own heads (Clark, 2003; 
Rotman, 2008). The arrival of a digital, electronically mediated global/regional 
world order has contributed significantly to this state of affairs. It is to the Bradley 
Report’s detriment that there is hardly any substantive discussion of these 
cognitive, epistemological and geopolitical shifts and their influence on 
electronically mediated learning and teaching. 
Equally important to the above-mentioned matrix of changes is the additive nature 
of the brain’s evolutionary capacities, a point André Leroi-Gourhan (1993, p. 402) 
explains as follows: 
All psychomotor evolution since the first vertebrates has been achieved 
through the addition of new territories that did not eliminate the functional 
importance of the preceding ones but preserved their role, increasingly 
overlaid by higher functions. 
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This is the evolutionary overlaying and interplay between the hindbrain, midbrain 
and forebrain. The whole mind+brain, then, is synchronically and diachronically 
plastic, additive and adaptive, and for the learner (a tag that applies to all of us) this 
is simultaneously and differentially a neuro-physiological fact and part and parcel 
of our psychological experience of learning. A pedagogy that incorporates these 
twin-intersecting pillars provides for a more fully rounded understanding of 
“experiential learning” (Kolb, 1984). This holistic understanding of neural and 
psychic plasticity as a dynamic conception of human knowledge-making is a case 
put cogently in François Ansermet and Pierre Magistretti’s Biology of Freedom 
(2007), a text written by both a psychoanalyst and a neuroscientist. That we have 
made little headway in articulating this regionally dynamic take on our learning 
arrangements (synthesising both a geographic and neurological understanding) 
works against our knowledge-making potential. 
It may now fall to an elegantly simple introductory text to convert sceptics to this 
transformed framework: How the Brain Learns (Souza, 2006) is an excellent 
beginning for those educators willing to dance the intermediating tango between 
the physiology and the psychology of learning. “The Resonating World of the 
Regional Mind+Brain”, then, is really just another prolegomena to such an 
understanding. This end is just the beginning of a much larger need to understand 
how learning and teaching regionally and globally via an electronic epistemology 
might be configured. It might also be a new dawning for regional universities to 
rethink their own regionality in light of these geo-political realignments (so 
obvious in the global education market) and the advances in human learning 
capacities brought about by developments in both the “psy-disciplines” and the 
neurosciences. There can be little doubt there is now a slow meltdown of the Berlin 
Wall that has separated these two disciplinary silos in the past. The endgame of this 
meltdown may be the point at which all manner of sovereign borders turn into 
permeable membranes, which would encourage the estimated 5000 “ethno-national 
groups” scattered across the globe to continue eating away at the legitimacy of the 
200 or so bounded nation-states (Paasi, 2003, p. 467), a select group that 
humanity’s collective planetary polity is currently constrained by. 
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